【北航经管学术论坛】
宋阳波助理教授讲座通知
报告题目：Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games
报告人：宋阳波助理教授香港中文大学（深圳）美高梅官网正网
时间：1月12日10：00—11：30
地点：A1038
邀请人：崔志伟副教授
摘要：This paper studies a novel setting
in game theory: a player may learn new actions over time by observing the
opponent's play. We investigate the impact of such learning behavior in the
context of finitely repeated games. In contrast to related literature such as
Kreps et al. (1982), we provide a framework with full rationality and
consistent stage-game payoffs for sustaining cooperation, which bridges the gap
between theories of finitely and infinitely repeated games. Even if rational
cooperation is impossible without learning, for instance in a Prisoner's
Dilemma, it can be sustained with approximate efficiency when players can learn
from one another. Cooperation does not have to be endowed in each player's
initial action set, but can be ``taught'' and enforced. When learning is
imperfect, the set of sustainable payoffs is not continuous, in the sense that
no equilibrium exists when learning is nearly perfect and the repeated games
last for sufficiently many periods.
经管学院科研办
2018-01-02
